The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was the greatest calamity of the 21^st century, greater than the 9/11 attacks, and greater than the 2008 financial meltdown.

It marked a turning point in European history, the end of countless illusions, and heightened security concerns for many countries, particularly those contiguous to the two protagonists. It called into question the value of the United Nations, provided a revitalisation of NATO and, paradoxically, furthered the move away from oil and gas to renewable energy sources. It confirmed that Europe, however configured, could not stand on its own with regard to security, and confirmed the United States as, in Madeleine Albright’s words, the ‘indispensable nation’. President Macron’s ‘strategic autonomy’ is now, if not a lost cause, certainly delayed for several years.

The Russian-Ukrainian war demonstrates that there are many more dimensions to security than the simply physical, satisfied by either adequate military or through alliances and treaties. Security is absolutely a political matter.

It might be asserted that much progress has been made over the past few years, that a security architecture has been outlined or formed, but coming second in any war is losing, not a consolation prize. Liberal, democratic countries losing the war against an authoritarian and dictatorial regime could have far-reaching and serious consequences. That applies as much to Europe as it does to Ukraine.

Let’s emphasise this: the United States, NATO, and Europe, however formed, may well facilitate Ukraine’s triumph over Russia, but the fact that the war started in the first place is a failure of Western international diplomacy stretching back to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Yes, the war was absolutely Putin’s responsibility but the West has agency for creating the circumstances.

And, as if to confirm the bad news, there are many second order issues to consider: the war represents the end of illusions about living with and accommodating authoritarian regimes, the end of any thoughts that reliance can be placed in treaties and international agreements in what is, to the realist, an anarchic international system.

It has shown in stark contrast the difficulty of achieving any consensus amongst European states. Although the EU and Europe as a whole have reacted well and generously to Ukraine’s predicament, there are growing divergencies amongst the countries as to how to continue, and particularly what the final resolution, in so far that such exists at all, might look like. The good news is that it has jolted Europe out of its fat, complacent slumber and demonstrated to Europe’s leaders that Europe, as one of the world’s largest economic and trading blocks, involves political responsibilities, accepted but unrealised, as well.

To resolve this current conflict will require formidable diplomatic skills, billions of dollars and persistence and stamina for the long haul. It will need many countries and institutions to provide security guarantees, to both Ukraine and the Russian Federation.

There have been two great surprises in this war, one a reflection of the other. Prior to the war, and in the early stages, some European countries were reluctant to provide arms and to support Ukraine on the basis that it would prolong the conflict and extend the agony. It was believed that the Russian armed forces were well equipped, well led, had a sound logistics capability and a good technological base. On the other hand, it was assumed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces, especially having had a hard time in Donbas, were poorly equipped and generally not up to the task. How wrong people were! We explore this in depth below, but in short, the Ukrainian army performed extraordinarily well, and encouraged other European countries, and particularly the United States to supply more and better munitions. The Russian army performed very poorly on every front. This demonstrates appalling intelligence failures. Our spies seriously underestimated Ukraine, and overestimated Russia. 

And this is where the war will have global consequences. Russia’s poor military and political performance may encourage other countries such as Belarus and Kazakhstan to distance themselves from the Russian Federation. It might also encourage China to acquire disputed territories in north Manchuria. Ukraine’s heroic performance and particularly the generous provision of munitions from the United States, might just deter China from thinking about acquiring Taiwan for the time being.

The war might be described as the first Internet war. Properly edited and cross-referenced, social media has provided invaluable data to organisations such as The Institute for the Study of War and Bellingcat who have usefully turned raw data into useful information.

Neither has been any admission that the intelligence agencies – and that includes military intelligence as well – had seriously overestimated the capabilities of the Russian Federation’s Army. The numerical advantage over the Ukrainians was well-known, and is publicly available, but what we – and Ukraine – needed to know was just how well the Russians would fight on the ground. We could easily understand that this represents the most challenging aspects for the intelligence agencies, but given that there are 16 agencies of the United States Intelligence Community, with over 100,000 employees and a combined budget of (according to the Washington Post) over $50billion, might not be American taxpayer have expected something more? Incidentally, according to some 10-year-old figures, some 70% of this budget goes to private companies. The UK equivalent seems to be around £3 billion, but the same criterion applies: what were the intelligence agencies doing?

In the third book in third trilogy, Prospects for War after Ukraine, we examine, after an  introduction to Part One

Chapter Two: The story so far

Chapter Three: Putin’s point of view and the Western position

Chapter Four: The Russian use of force

Chapter Five: The Russian Army and its shortcomings

Chapter Six: Strategic consequences for the West

Chapter Seven: The strategic consequences for NATO

Chapter Eight: Diagnosis and prognosis

Appendix One: Russian-Ukrainian War Outline Chronology

Appendix Two: Project Solarium

Part Two covers issues such as ‘The nation, the state and war’; ‘The nuclear question and dereliction of duty’; ‘A few (more) words on strategy’; ‘NATO and European security’; ‘Conclusions to the trilogy Making Sense of War’